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Abstract 
Traditionally, cognition was understood as a 
computational process in the brain. Conventional views 
are inclined towards the existence of discrete and internal 
representations realised by highly specific mechanisms in 
the brain. The embodied approach challenges this view 
and accepts the evolution of cognitive abilities. There is a 
shift in focus from considering the brain as solely 
responsible for cognition to believing that the body is 
deeply integrated in cognitive functioning. However, it 
does not deny the central position of the brain in the 
process of cognition but considers the possibility of 
including other factors. At the basic level, there are three 
ways in which an agent‟s body can be utilised for the 
cognitive process. An agent‟s body may help to generate, 
operate and distribute the cognitive processes. This 
perspective diminishes the monopoly of the brain by 
taking into account the importance of the body and the 
environment for cognition. 
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1. Introduction 
Embodied cognition is a recent emerging viewpoint in cognitive 
science which holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in 
an agent‟s bodily interaction with the world (Wilson, 2002). It has 
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been argued that humans have evolved from organisms whose 
neural resources were linked mainly with the perceptual and 
sensory-motor processing and whose cognitive activities were 
related to the immediate interaction with the environment. For 
many decades, cognition has been viewed as a sort of 
computational process in the brain. The brain plays a central role 
but embodied cognition minimises the role of the brain in cognitive 
processing. Traditionally, the mind was viewed as an abstract 
information processor which had little connection with the outside 
world and perceptual and motor systems were not considered 
relevant to understanding central cognitive processes. They were 
kept in the periphery of the cognitive processes and taken into 
account only as input and output devices. 
Conventional views are inclined towards the existence of discrete 
and internal representations realised by highly specific mechanisms 
in the brain. It was assumed that these mechanisms were shaped by 
natural evolution and coded in our genetics. This view leads to 
individualism or internalism which claims that cognition is 
supervened on the internal nature of the cogniser. This type of 
research methodology which is solely based on the internal nature 
is called „Methodological Solipsism‟ (Fodor, 1980). In this way, all 
core topics of cognitive neuroscience were accounted locally 
without challenging the boundaries of the brain-skull. Even if there 
has been consideration of moving beyond this boundary, they have 
been limited in their consideration by including sensory input and 
behavioural output only. Traditional views of the mind and 
cognition were dedicated towards the „classical sandwich model‟ 
(Hurley & Noe, 2003), where mind/cognition is sandwiched 
between perception (input) and action (output). The embodied 
cognitive approach accepts cognition as a result of active and 
dynamic interaction between an agent‟s neural and non-neural 
processes. It does not make a watertight bifurcation between 
cognition, agent‟s bodily experience and real-life situations. 
Looking at how the body performs these functions in the external 
world provides evidence that cognition is neither bounded by the 
brain, nor by the body itself.  
Earlier, cognitive processes (traditional approach towards 
cognition) were treated to be autonomous, occurring in the brain 
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and alienated from the world. But, with the advancement in 
scientific experiments, it has been found that the brain is only one 
part of the whole cognitive system. It is more like the CPU of a 
computer, the main device for processing. However, the result of 
that processing is dependent on and influenced by inputs and 
outputs. Similarly, the brain also processes upon the inputs in the 
form of stimulus received from the world through sense organs 
and exerts the output in the form of motor actions. Initially, when a 
child is born, the pre-stored concepts in the brain are missing but it 
receives all this input in the form of stimulus which essentially 
organises the brain. In the initial phase, the regions of the brain are 
not actually pre-determined. Mriganka Sur's experiment also 
proved that “experience shapes the brain” not “by the brain” (Roe, 
Pallas, Kwon, & Sur, 1992). In this experiment; they rewired the 
brain of a ferret so that the information from its retina was plugged 
into its auditory cortex. The assumption was that the animal would 
be blinded but ferrets could still see. Furthermore, their auditory 
cortex now resembled the typical ferret visual cortex, complete 
with spatial maps and neurons tuned to detect light. This shows 
that there is nothing special in the cells in the visual cortex that 
makes them visual. Therefore, it was concluded that the areas of 
the brain responsible for a particular cognitive process can be 
altered. This „neural plasticity‟ shows that the association of a 
particular brain area with a cognitive activity is not fixed; they co-
evolve. The different brain areas are structured according to their 
ability to perform functions. For example, language skills do not 
pre-exist. Thus, the part of the brain responsible for it is not 
specifically created for it; it is just used for it. Hence, the idea that 
everything is pre-programmed, like the pre-made house blocks that 
we suddenly put together to construct houses in one day, is not 
how the brain works. The brain is like houses that we construct 
from scratch- step by step. 
2. What is Embodied Cognition? 
Embodied cognition is an idea that shifts focus from the thesis that 
the brain is the solely responsible resource available for cognition 
to the thought that the body is deeply integrated into the cognition. 
Embodied cognition does not deny the central position of the brain 
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in the process of cognition but opens up the door to other factors 
for integration. In this sense, it is not like a well-defined theory but 
a research programme. The embodiment thesis is based on the 
assumption that the interaction of mind, body and the environment 
is essential to cognition. An agent‟s bodily interaction with the 
world enables it to conceive and perceive the world. We think 
because we have inputs from the outside world to ponder upon. 
Wilson and Foglia (2011)states, “cognition is embodied when it is 
deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, 
that is, when aspects of the agent‟s body beyond the brain play a 
significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive 
processing”(Wilson & Foglia, 2011). In this definition, two phrases 
are important because they form two major claims for the 
embodied cognition: ‘agent’s body beyond the brain’ and ‘causal or 
constitutive role’. Earlier, before the emergence of the embodied 
cognition as a concept, the body was not taken into account for the 
understanding of the nature of mind and cognition, and the view 
that the think tank was situated inside the skull was dominant. So, 
the idea of embodied cognition mainly attacks this solipsistic view 
of cognition (Fodor, 1980). Embodied cognition also argues about 
the body‟s causal role in shaping the mind. It simply means that 
mental states (particularly cognitive process) are not just the brain 
possesses but it is the result of an agent‟s body and its interaction 
with the environment. 
2.1. Cognition as an Adaptive Evolution 
Embodied cognition accepts cognition as an adaptive evolution 
process within the biological theory of evolution. It argues that 
cognition evolved in organisms to interact with the environment in 
a better manner. It provided the tools to cope up with the ever-
changing environment and for their survival. Michael Anderson 
says that “Embodied cognition treats cognition as a set of tools 
evolved by organisms for coping with their environment” 
(Anderson, 2005). Each key term (tools, evolve, organisms, cope, 
environment) in this defining line is important and plays a 
significant role in understanding embodied cognition as an 
adaptive phenomenon. Cognition as a skill has an evolutionary 
history. This implies that cognition is adapted by the evolving 
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organisms. It also evolves as it helps organisms to enhance their 
survival by gaining better control over their dynamic environment. 
Most organisms are concerned with survival and reproduction. 
With the evolution of cognitive capacity, they can take advantage 
of the diverse features of the environment for their utility. Humans 
are at the peak of evolution and cognitive capacity and therefore 
they have much greater control over the environment to utilise and 
change it according to their need. 
Cognition co-evolved in organisms with specific emotional and 
physical characteristics. Emotions worked as an important self-
regulatory aspect of embodied cognition. Emotions in a way 
worked as a motivator towards goal-relevant actions which helped 
in driving adaptive behaviour. This resulted in greater interaction 
and influence over the world and other organisms. Certain bodily 
features of organisms take advantage of cognitive processes. Every 
organism extensively uses their body structures to enhance the 
survival and activity in the environment. Our specific anatomy 
leads to the variety of things we can do. In particular, humans are 
fairly distinct in their ability to create tools and languages. The 
concept related to this adaptive cognition and anatomy is 
‘Affordance’.  
Affordance is just the usage of an object based on our ability to 
interact with it. For instance, a teacup has the affordance of being 
grabbed because of its handle. It fits into the hand (palm) and one 
can drink from it because it has a rim. So before designing an 
object, one has to keep in mind the ways in which it would be used 
by humans based on their bodily abilities. Humans have ten 
fingers, five on each hand, large palms, arms that have a certain 
degree of movement and so on. All these bodily features help us to 
interact with the environment and take part in the cognitive 
processes. Thus it can be said that cognition is a mix of cognitive 
tools, (specific interaction with the world and co-operative 
interaction with the other organisms) that evolved due to the 
adaptive nature of the organism for enhancing their status of 
survival and controlling the surroundings for their benefit. 
Embodied cognition was a response to the idea that mental states 
are pre-made and fitted into the brain but mind (mental states) is 
not pre-made. In the words of Varela, the traditional approach 
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treated cognition as the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-
given mind, but the embodied approach considers it as the enactment 
of a world and a mind through various actions that are performed by 
a being-in-the-world (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1992). We are 
situated in the world. We use our bodies to interact with the world. 
Therefore, cognition is formed on the basis of both the body and 
the world. In this sense, our cognition behaves like a dynamical 
system. 
2.2. Embodied Cognition as a Dynamical System 
The main approach is that cognitive systems are dynamical agents 
(Smith, 2005). This provides a break from the Cartesian legacy 
which argues that the brain is solely responsible for all mental 
states which in turn can affect bodily states. On the other hand, the 
dynamical system provides a view that all that is associated with 
the term 'mind' is fully incorporated into the natural world. A 
dynamical system is one which performs its activities and produces 
the result without having the conception of any central controller. 
They perform their activity by coupling with the various parts of 
the system. They are so coupled that any minor changes in a part 
can affect the overall performance of the whole system. This 
dynamical system approach for psychological processes is inspired 
by the Watt’s Governor Model which argues that the mind is not a 
single entity. It is coupled with the environment and hence behaves 
like a system. 
Dynamicists try to minimise and even sometimes deny the need for 
a centralised representational processing unit. They counter the 
traditional representational idea which says that an internal model 
is capable of producing the external structures that can be used by 
the cognitive agent to guide the behaviour of the agent. But 
dynamical theory tries to explain the agent‟s behaviour in terms of 
embodiment and embeddedness. It argues that we can discard the 
notion of abstract symbolic description if an agent can sense its 
world and allows its body to be directly influenced by the world.  
3. Major Claims/Support for Embodied Cognition 
Embodied cognition is a relatively recent comprehensive 
framework for the study of the mind. This approach has recently 
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attained high acceptance in the cognitive psychology arena. There 
is a growing idea that the mind must be understood in the context 
of an agent‟s relationship and interaction with the world. There has 
been a lot of support coming in from the experimental procedures 
in psychology where the psychologists ask subjects to perform 
specific tasks by manipulating their bodies in certain ways. They 
find that the subjects differ and the results depend on simple facts 
such as whether they are right or left handed. There is also work in 
robotics where robots have been designed to perform complex 
tasks like navigating through a room and so on in a way that does 
not rely on computationalism that once was thought to be the only 
way out. 
There is an obvious line of thought that cognition happening in a 
particular situation must deal with the constraints of „real-time‟ 
pressure. An organism in a real environment has to act fast to cope 
up with the potential hostile and changing environment, predators, 
stationary objects, and other threats. This claim also counters the 
traditional representational view. In the real world, situations 
demand fast and continuously evolving response. There is limited 
time available to an organism to build up a comprehensive mental 
model for motor action. But it is argued that being situated in a 
condition, the agent requires efficient ways of generating situation 
appropriate action on the go. All creatures have cognitive 
limitations. Humans have limited information-processing abilities 
like limits of attention, working memory and so forth. Therefore, to 
cope up with the fast-changing environment, help must be taken 
from other available resources. Humans must use the environment 
itself to reduce their cognitive workload. An organism can 
overcome their cognitive load in two ways: „using features of the 
stable environment‟ and by „changing environment itself’ in their 
favour. For example, hunting animals can use scent trails or visual 
signs like burrow holes to find their desired prey (stable 
environmental feature), using fingers or pen-paper to ease the 
counting processes (changing the environment). In these ways, an 
organism can take advantage to enhance the ability to interact and 
change its environment. Cognitive processes involve very complex 
and dense information flow between the brain and the world. 
Many scientific and behavioural experiments show that these 
complex operations cannot be performed by the brain alone. It is 
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done by the brain, body and environment altogether. Factors 
responsible for the cognitive activities do not reside within the 
boundary of the skull but they are distributed across the individual 
and the situation in which it interacts. It behaves as a single 
coupled system where the cogniser and the cognitive environment 
get integrated. 
The main function of the mind is to guide actions through cognitive 
mechanisms and it should be understood in terms of contributing 
to an agent‟s behaviour. The cognitive system is evolved because it 
is a behavioural control system which is an important trait for 
adaptation. Cognitive systems should be studied in terms of their 
functions in serving. Therefore, it is hard to alienate the world from 
the cognitive system. For example, the traditional view of visual 
perception proposes that the visual system present for the building 
of internal representation of the perceived world is used by some 
higher mechanisms in the brain. However, it has now been 
understood that visual perception is used for guiding actions. For 
instance, there is a study by David Kirsh and Paul Maglio on the 
Tetris game (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). In the Tetris game, falling block 
shapes must be rotated and horizontally fitted as compact as 
possible along with the shapes already fallen. This decision of 
rotation should be made early before the block falls far down to 
allow possible movements. The data shows that players use actual 
rotation and translation movements to simplify the problem to be 
solved, rather than computing a solution in mind first and then 
executing it. This clearly shows that visual cognition is used in 
guiding action and not merely for creating representations in the 
brain (Wilson, 2002). 
Margret Wilson‟s „six views of embodied cognition‟ provides a very 
comprehensive account of the topic (Wilson, 2002). It covers most, 
if not all, possible aspects in which cognitive activity occurs. The 
crux of the whole discussion is that the characteristics of cognition 
are dependent upon the characteristics of the physical body of the 
agent. These beyond, the brain-body features play a causal and 
constitutive role in the cognitive processes. This is in sharp 
distinction with the view that mind is the dominant entity in 
cognitive processes. Now, there is a need to specify the nature of 
the dependence of cognition on the body. What role does the body 
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play on an agent‟s cognition? How does a body prove useful in the 
process of cognition? At the most general level, it can be stated that 
there are three distinct roles which a body plays in the whole 
cognitive process. Sometimes, a body helps to generate some 
content for cognition. It helps to distribute some cognitive processes 
and operates the overall cognitive activity as well. Talking 
metaphorically, body behaves as GOD for cognition: „G‟ as „Generator‟, 
„O‟ as „Operator‟ and „D‟ as „Distributor‟. 
a. Body as a generator 
An agent‟s body is an important part of cognition but it sets a limit 
too. There is a strong relationship between the kind of body an 
organism possesses and the concepts an organism can acquire. A 
particular cognition can seem easier or complex depending upon 
the agent‟s bodily characteristics. For instance, there is a difference 
between how humans and bats perceive the world. This difference 
in cognition arises due to differences in bodily characteristics, 
particularly sense organs. Sometimes particular characteristics of 
an organism can give rise to very different cognitive content which 
humans can never experience. In humans, the gesture is one such 
bodily feature through which they create and understand several 
concepts thereby enhancing their overall cognitive ability.  
b. Body as an operator: 
An agent‟s body functions in many ways to control and operate 
cognitive activities. It regulates cognition activities over space and 
time. As already stated, one of the main purposes of cognition is to 
perform actions to cope with the environment. An agent‟s body 
functions to regulate the co-ordination between cognition and 
action. Bodily structures of the agent facilitate real-time execution 
of complex behavioural activities in response to complex and fast-
changing environmental events. The body functions to extract 
information from the world in the form of cognition and later 
delivers the output into the world in the form of behaviour or 
action. The body plays a feedback-driven role in cognitive 
processes. In this case, the body is more like a dynamical system 
which performs their functions without any central controller, 
solely based on the external stimulus. 
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c. Body as a distributor: 
An agent‟s body serves to distribute cognitive tasks between the 
brain and the body. The body helps to distribute computational 
and representational load between the neural (brain) and the non-
neural (body) structures. The traditional view of cognition (that 
cognition is confined to the brain areas only) can be challenged by 
this function. Body as a distributor implies that cognition is not 
bounded by the skull and is related tobeyond-the-body 
environment. The body helps to offload (distribute) the cognitive 
work and ease the whole cognitive process. Offloading would 
mean taking an internal mental task and giving it a physical form 
outside of the brain. It comes handy when we have a difficult task 
at hand. Offloading essentially extends the mental capacity thereby 
increasing retention. Offloading can be extended to gestures also. 
Offloading is important during note-taking when internal thoughts 
are transferred into the physical world via pen and paper. 
4. Conclusion 
Conventional cognitive science is based on two assumptions which 
include the understanding that there is an impoverishment of 
stimulus data and there is a need for an internal representational 
calculation on stimulus data. Embodied cognition overcomes these 
assumptions and counts all the resources available in the 
environment that might support complex behaviour in real-time. 
The important result of this line of research is that we are able to 
use and produce all kinds of complex behaviour. This 
understanding removes the necessity of any central 
representational entity to explain cognition and behaviour. Our 
cognition is the result of bridging of three basic units: brain, body, 
and the environment. The body can participate in cognitive 
processes in the most engaging way i.e. to help in generating 
content for cognition, to distribute cognitive tasks over the body 
and beyond the body, and to coordinate cognitive processes itself. 
These are some ways by which mental tasks are taken and put into 
the physical world in order to ease survival and ensure better 
coping with the surrounding. 
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